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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis investigates the scope and implied State‟s duty under Article 3 and its overlap 
with Article 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The hypothesis is that the 
procedural part of Article 3 may threaten the absolute and unconditional character of the 
substantive part of Article 3 and there can be convincing legal reasons for choosing Article 
13 over Article 3 when examining the lack of a thorough and effective investigation an 
arguable claim based on Article 3. 
 
This thesis has mainly adopted the legal approach and therefore it is an article-specific 
legal paper. The entire substantive and procedural areas of the paper are discussed in the 
context of Article 3 and Article 13 jurisprudence of the European Convention on Human 
Rights. In addition to that, however, time-to-time jurisprudence of Article 1 and 2 of the 
Convention are referred in order to support the argument and explain the scopes of Article 
3 and 13 better. 
 
The methodology of this paper is based on legal analysing of the European Human Rights 
Court case-laws, judgments and interpretation of these articles concerning to ill-treatment 
which illustrate the operational and procedural rules, the application of substantive law, as 
well as the right to an effective remedy.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Presentation of the topic 
 
With its absolute nature of prohibition the Article 3 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights comprises a prohibition to engage in actual torture as well as implies duty to 
provide remedies for the victims of torture by the contracting states. They are inherent 
obligations and certain rights under the Convention which have the substantive and 
procedural aspects that are separate from each other. The substantive obligations in Article 
3 are absolute and unqualified but procedural obligations of it are not absolute because the 
State can exercise some judgment in applying them. In a number of cases the European 
Court of Human Rights finds a breach of the procedural part of Article 3 while finds no 
breach at its substantive part.
 1
  This thesis accordingly will try to learn in what conditions 
the procedural part of Article 3 may be threatening the absolute and unconditional 
character of the substantive part of Article 3 and what is a implied State‟s duty to conduct 
an effective investigation in case of alleged violation of Article 3. 
 
In addition to the above mentioned focus this thesis also investigates the state obligation to 
carry out an effective investigation either from the standpoint of the procedural obligation 
inherent in Article 3 or from the standpoint of the right to an effective remedy under 
Article 13. In other words, the thesis aims to discuss a scope of Article 3 and its implied 
State‟s duty and investigate whether Article 13 can constitute the appropriate legal basis 
for examining the lack of an effective investigation into an arguable claim based on Article 
3. In order to establish the boundaries of the Contracting Parties‟ jurisdiction within the 
meaning of Article 3 and Article 13, interpret and apply the implied State‟s obligations 
under these articles the case-laws of the Court have been referred. No doubt that there 
could be many reasons to accuse of ignoring some cases and points at the paper but the 
reason by doing this is that the thesis tries to choose those decisions and judgments which 
best give picture of inter- article relations and introduce how the European Human Rights 
Court recognize the jurisprudence of Article 3 and Article 13.  
 
                                                 
1 Read Chapter 1.3.3 Is the procedural part of Article 3 threatening the substantive part of it? 
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Methodology 
 
Due to its article-specific nature and legal analysis approach of this thesis all the 
substantive and procedural areas are discussed in the context of Article 3 and Article 13 
jurisprudence of the European Convention on Human Rights. The methodology of this 
paper accordingly is based on legal analysing of the Court case-laws, judgments and 
interpretation of mentioned Article 3 and Article 13 concerning to ill-treatment which 
illustrate the operational, procedural rules, the application of substantive law and as well as 
the right to an effective remedy.  
 
Under jurisprudence of Article 3 torture and most forms of inhuman treatment/punishment 
can not be justified in any circumstances but some degrading treatments can be justified in 
some circumstances. Accordingly, some legal punishments can be justified as degrading. 
For example, the Court has drawn a distinction between ordinary prison conditions and 
those which fall below an acceptable standard. The below standard prisons can be argued 
inhuman and degrading violation but since intention of this thesis is not to find out what is 
a acceptable standard and limit for the behaviour and actions both by state and individuals 
in order to argue whether Article 3 is violated or not and therefore, this paper will not 
discuss prohibited activities under Article 3 neither separately nor generally. This research 
intends to refer to prohibited activities under Article 3 as an “ill-treatment” or “torture” and 
to investigate inter-article relations, Article 3 and Article 13, and state‟s implied 
obligations under these articles.     
 
 
Research Questions 
 
The research questions are formulated in order better illustrate the operational and 
procedural rules, the application of substantive law and the right to an effective remedy of 
Article 3 and Article 13. Since the duty to conduct effective investigation in connection to 
arguable claims relating to torture forms part of the prohibition of torture under Article 3 
and as the Court‟s standing jurisprudence dictates, the Convention is intended to guarantee 
rights which are not theoretical or illusory but practical and effective
2
, the questions of this 
thesis are as following: 
                                                 
2
 Ilhan v. Turkey, no. 22277/93, 27 June 2000 § 91 
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        1 .Is the procedural part of Article 3 threatening the absolute and unconditional   
          character of the substantive part of Article 3? 
 
        2. Should the Court examine the substantive violation at the root of the application        
           for Article 3 or should it confine itself to establishing a procedural violation? 
 
        3. How much implied duty of States to conduct an effective investigation in case of  
          alleged violations of Article 3 overlap with Article 13 which already provides a   
          similar positive obligation or which Article should be chosen over another one for to     
          conduct an effective investigation? 
 
The absolute nature of the prohibition of torture in international law 
 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 5); International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (Article 7); American Convention on Human Rights (Article 5); African 
Charter on Human and Peoples‟ Rights (Article 5); Arab Charter on Human Rights (Article 
13); United Nations Convention Against Torture and European Convention for Prevention 
of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment recognize the prohibition 
of torture and other forms of ill-treatments. The prohibition against torture is backbone of 
the international humanitarian law and applicable rules of customary international law. The 
absolute nature of the prohibition of torture under treaty is reinforced by its higher, jus 
cogens status under customary international law. In other words, no interpretation of treaty 
obligations that is inconsistent with the absolute prohibition of torture is valid in 
international law.
3
 
 
In Selmouni v. France
4
 case the Court manifestly expressed the aim of increasing standard 
of human rights
5
. The ill-treatment that might previously have been regarded by the Court 
as causing suffering could now be classified as „torture‟. The Court required greater 
firmness assessing breaches of the fundamental values of democratic society. Naturally, 
                                                 
3
 Joint Third Party intervention of Aminnisty International, The Association for the Prevention of Torture, 
Human Rights Watch, Interights, the International Commission of Jurists, Open Society Justice Initiative and 
Redress in Ramzy v. Netherlands, 22 November 2005  
4
 Selmouni v. France, no. 25803/94, 28 July  
5
 Selmouni v. France, no. 25803/94, 28 July, § 101 The court states: It takes the view that the increasingly 
high standard being required in the area of the protection of human rights and fundamental liberties 
correspondingly and inevitably requires greater firmness in assessing breaches of the fundamental values of 
democratic societies. 
8 
 
the Article 3 enshrines one of the most fundamental
6
 values to be protected under the 
Convention. The Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights states these most 
fundamental values as following: 
 
        No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or         
       punishment. 
 
The Article 3 concerns freedom from torture, inhuman treatment, degrading treatment or 
inhuman and degrading punishment. It covers three main separate prohibited categories of 
treatment that are: 
 
(a) Torture: deliberate inhuman treatment causing very serious and cruel suffering 
(b) Inhuman treatment: treatment that causes intense physical and mental suffering 
(c) Degrading treatment: treatment/punishment that arouses in the victim a feeling of 
fear, anguish and inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing the victim and 
possibility breaking his or her physical or moral resistance. 
 
At the case-laws the Court means that suffering must be inflicted intentionally and for a 
purpose, such as obtaining evidence, punishment, or intimidation.  In Aksoy v. Turkey case 
the Court indicates that: 
 
63. In order to determine whether any particular form of ill-treatment 
should be qualified as torture, the Court must have regard to the 
distinction drawn in Article 3 (art. 3) between this notion and that of 
inhuman or degrading treatment.  As it has remarked before, this 
distinction would appear to have been embodied in the Convention to 
allow the special stigma of "torture" to attach only to deliberate inhuman 
treatment causing very serious and cruel suffering.
7
  
 
The situations like ill-treatment in detention, deportation or extradition where there is a real 
risk of inhuman treatment in the country of destination,
8
 anxiety caused by failure to carry 
                                                 
6
 Pretty v. the United Kingdom, no. 2346/02, 29 April 2002, §??? 
7
 Aksoy v. Turkey, no. 21987/93, 18 December 1996, § 63 
8
 Soering v. the United Kingdom, no. 14038/88, 7 July 1989  
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out a proper investigation into a disappearance,
9
 destruction of personal property
10
 have 
been found by the Court to amount to inhuman treatment.
11
   
 
Above mentioned categories of treatments places a negative duty on the state not to inflict 
them on human beings and it also puts duty to ensure that these treatments and sufferings 
are not endured. The importance of this article reflects in its absolute nature of the 
prohibition of torture and non-derogable status.
12
 The European Court has held that the 
Article 3 prohibition protects “one of the fundamental values of the democratic societies 
making up the Council of Europe”.13 The Court has found many forms of conduct to be 
capable of breaching Article 3.
14
 Although most if not all punishments are degrading and 
inhuman treatment or punishment and they may often be found coexisting with degrading 
treatment or punishment. The Court defined that degradation must be intentional
15
 and 
treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of 
Article 3.
16
 This test, “minimum level of severity”, will apply whatever the category of 
conduct in issue.
17
 
 
The use of terms 
 
The European Court of Human Rights at this paper is referred as “the Court”; the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as “the 
                                                 
9
 Kurt v. Turkey, no. 15/1997/799/1002, 25 May 1998 
10
 Selcuk and Asker v. Turkey, no. 12/1997/796/998-999, 24 April 1998, § 78 
11
 C. Ovey & Robin White, Jacobs & White: The European Convention on Human Rights, 4
th
 edition, Oxford 
University Press, 2006, p. 81 
12
 Article 15(2) of Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms  
13
 Soering v. the United Kingdom, no. 14038/88, 7 July 1989   
14
 Chapter 15 of European Huma Rights Law by Keir Starmer, Legal Action Group, 1999 
15
 Denizci and Others v. Cyprus (2001), CEDH ) § 383: “… Ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of 
severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3 (see Ireland v. the United Kingdom, cited above, p. 65, § 
162). However, in order to determine whether a particular form of ill-treatment should be characterized as 
torture, the Court must have regard to the distinction, embodied in the provision, between that notion and that 
of inhuman or degrading treatment. As the Court has previously found, it appears that it was the intention that 
the Convention should, by means of this distinction, attach a special stigma to deliberate inhuman treatment 
causing very serious and cruel suffering (see Selmouni, cited above, § 96).” 
16
 Assenov and Others v. Bulgaria case-law: “The Court recalls that ill-treatment must attain a minimum 
level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3. The assessment of this minimum is relative: it 
depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical and/or mental 
effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim. In respect of a person deprived of his 
liberty, recourse to physical force which has not been made strictly necessary by his own conduct diminishes 
human dignity and is in principle an infringement of the right set forth in Article 3 (see the Tekin v. Turkey 
judgment of 9 June 1998, Reports 1998-IV, pp. 1517–18, §§ 52 and 53).” 
17
 C. Ovey & Robin White, Jacobs & White: The European Convention on Human Rights, 4
th
 edition, Oxford 
University Press, 2006, p. 75 
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Convention” or as “European Convention on Human Rights”; and a collective term for all 
forms treatment prohibited by Article 3 such as torture, inhuman treatment and degrading 
treatment as either “torture” or “ill- treatment”. 
 
The structure of the thesis 
 
The first chapter introduces the European Convention on Human Rights and the Court as 
well as elaborates inherent obligations of Article 3 and its state obligations. The State‟s 
obligations like the obligation to take effective investigation after the breach of the article, 
the obligation to take effective measures within state jurisdiction against the violation and 
importance of introduction of effective criminal law are discussed. 
  
The discussion related to the scope of Article 3 and its current role in the international law 
explains importance of the article. In addition to that, the state responsibility to refrain 
from using torture and ill-treatment against civilians in its jurisprudence and its duty 
effectively investigate in case of the breach regardless violation made either by the state 
actors or by private individuals. The importance of criminal law and required grounds for 
effective protection of rights and duties to take effective investigation are among explained 
and discussed state obligations. 
  
The chapter two discusses the inherent state‟s obligations under Article 13 of the 
Convention. At this chapter other application areas of Article 13 are also discussed. Clear 
analysing of grounds of effective remedy like „arguable claim‟ and „aggregate of remedies‟ 
opens deeper analysing and understanding of the jurisprudence of Article 13.    
 
The chapter three brings inter-article jurisprudence and scale overlapping and effectiveness 
of measuring implied state‟s obligations under Article 3 and 13 together. The purpose of 
this chapter is to discuss effective investigation opportunities inherited by the Article 3 and 
Article 13 and investigate whether ill-treatment should be investigated from the standpoint 
of Article 3 or from the standpoint of Article 13. The chapter also tries to define and show 
overlapping areas between the implied State‟s duty under Article 3 and that under Article 
13 and argues the reasons why Article 13 should be chosen over Article 3 in some 
situations. 
 
11 
 
The last Chapter of the thesis is a Conclusion Chapter which sums up all the discussions at 
the different Chapters and measures if the hypothesis was proved right or wrong by the 
European Court of Human Right. 
12 
 
CHAPTER I  
INHERENT STATE OBLIGATIONS UNDER ARTICLE 3 
 
1. The European Convention on Human Rights and scope of Article 3  
 
The European Convention on Human Rights was drafted under the auspices of the Council 
of Europe and signed first in 1950.
18
 The Article 1 of the Convention states that “[t]he 
High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and 
freedoms defined in the … Convention”.19  The Convention Articles from Articles 2 until 
Article 14 are declaratory in the sense that they do not, on their own, impose any 
obligations on the Contracting Parties. It is Article 1 of the Convention which transforms 
this declaration of rights into a set of obligations for the Contracting Parties
20
  and leaves 
the domestic authorities to decide how best to set up the required legal framework.
21
 The 
object and purpose of the Convention have had a strong influence on the interpretation of 
the Convention. The domestic authorities are expected to apply techniques of interpretation 
of the Convention with good faith and admit the principal purpose of the Convention to 
protect individual rights from infringement by the state and refrain from interference with 
the rights in question. The domestic authorities are expected to interpret the Convention 
articles as the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties requires: 
 
…shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to 
be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and 
purpose.
22
 
 
The Convention guarantees majority civil liberties including the right to life, freedom from 
torture, freedom from arbitrary arrest and etc. The protected rights
23
 by the Convention are 
mostly civil and political
24
 rights in nature and may be loosely categorized as absolute, 
                                                 
18
 The first ratification of the Convention came from the United Kingdom, 8 March 1951 but ten months later 
the second ratification came from Norway. Norwegian ratification did not contain declaration on individual 
petition nor on the Court, but Swedish ratification which followed on 4 February 1952, did contain a 
declaration recognizing the right of individual petition to Commission. 
19
 Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Rome, 4 November 1950 
20
 C. Ovey & R. C.A. White, Jacobs & White: The European Convention on Human Rights, 3
rd
 edition, 
Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 14 
21
 STARMER, Keir: European Human Rights Law, Legal Action Group, London, 1999, p.196 
22
 Article 31, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, done at Vienna on 23 May 1969. Entered into 
force on 27 January 1980.United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1155, p. 331 
23
 The rights protected under the Convention are framed in wide terms.  
24
 Exception: The right to property and the right to education in Protocol 1. 
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limited and qualified rights. The rights such as the protection from torture in Article 3 are 
absolute rights. The absolute rights have positive obligations on the states and require an 
appropriate legal framework capable of protecting individuals from such conduct.
25
 
Moreover, this kind of rights, the absolute rights, is not balancing of the right against 
public interest and derogation is not permitted. Therefore, it has absolute prohibition use of 
torture in any case. In Corsacov v. Moldova
26
 case the Court states that: 
 
54. …Article 3 enshrines one of the most fundamental values of 
democratic societies. Even in the most difficult circumstances, such as 
the fight against terrorism and organised crime, the Convention prohibits 
in absolute terms torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment. Unlike most of the substantive clauses of the Convention 
and of Protocols Nos. 1 and 4, Article 3 makes no provision for 
exceptions and no derogation from it is permissible under Article 15 § 2 
even in the event of a public emergency threatening the life of the nation 
(see Selmouni v. France [GC], no. 25803/94, § 95, ECHR 1999-V, and 
the Assenov and Others v. Bulgaria judgment of 28 October 1998, 
Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-VIII, p. 3288, § 93).
27
 
 
Article 13 of the Convention requires that everyone whose rights and freedoms set 
forth in the Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a 
national authority, even though that the violation has been committed by the state 
agent. For those cases where a national procedure is not available or does not 
provide for an adequate remedy or in the last resort has not available has not 
produced satisfactory result in the opinion of the rights violated person the 
Convention itself provides for a supervisory mechanism on the basis of individual 
and State complains. The Convention had an objective to set up international 
machinery to protect human rights where individuals can obtain respite from 
oppressive acts of the Government under whose jurisdiction he or she happens to 
be.
28
  
                                                 
25
 These obligations of a special type are assumed by each contracting state to persons within their 
jurisdiction, and not to other contacting states. 
26
 Corsacov v. Moldova, no. 18944/02, 4 April 2006 
27
 Corsacov v. Moldova, no. 18944/02, 4 April 2006, § 54 
28
 R. Beddard, Human Rights and Europe, Cambridge 1993, p. 7 
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1.1 The European Court of Human Rights 
 
Article 19 of the Convention sets legal grounds for the establishment of the 
European Court of Human Rights and it makes the Convention the first 
international legal instrument to safeguard human rights through an enforcement 
mechanism. It provides safeguarding of human rights for both states and 
individual applications. Under Article 33, any party may bring an application 
alleging a breach by another party that has ratified the Convention. Furthermore, 
the Court‟s power and duties are best described by the Court itself in J. H v. the 
United Kingdom case-law: 
 
76. …its duty, according to Article 19 of the Convention, is to ensure the 
observance of the engagements undertaken by the Contracting States to the 
Convention. In particular, it is not its function to deal with errors of fact or of 
law allegedly committed by a national court unless and in so far as they may 
have infringed rights and freedoms protected by the Convention.
29
 
 
Although the Court is not authorized under the Convention to order a State to carry out 
particular measures of reparation or to change its law or practice in any particular way but 
Article 32 of the Convention extends Court‟s jurisdiction to all matters concerning the 
interpretation and application of the Convention. The Court speaks through its judgments 
and in every decision and judgments adopted by the Court, there is references to, and 
quotations from, previous decisions and judgments of the Convention institution.
30
 
  
1.2 The scope of Article 3 
The scope of Article 3 of the Convention has been elaborated and the boundaries of the 
Contracting Parties‟ jurisdiction have been resolved by the Court in its case-laws. The 
case-laws show that the obligation of safeguard personal integrity under Article 3 may 
require states to do more than enact and enforce criminal law. Citing A. v the United 
Kingdom case, the Court held that the Article 3 duty obliges states to take reasonable steps: 
  
                                                 
29
 P.G and J. H v. the United Kingdom, no. 44787/98, 25 September 2001, § 76 
30
 STARMER, Keir: European Human Rights Law, Legal Action Group, London, 1999, p. 54 
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… The obligation on High Contracting Parties under Article 1 of the 
Convention to secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and 
freedoms defined in the Convention, taken together with Article 3, 
requires States to take measures designed to ensure that individuals 
within their jurisdiction are not subjected to torture or inhuman or 
degrading treatment, including such ill-treatment administered by private 
individuals.
31
 
 
Although Article 3 is phrased in substantive terms, it puts both procedural (positive) and 
substantive (negative) obligations upon States. The substantive obligations in Article 3 are 
absolute and unqualified but procedural obligations of it are not absolute because the State 
can exercise some judgment in applying them. All judgments, decisions and advisory 
opinions of the European Court of the Human Rights reconfirm absolute nature of Article 3 
and consider whether there has been breach of this Article from inherent state‟s duty 
context.  
 
1.3 State obligations under Article 3 
 
The European Convention on Human Rights guarantees to individuals a certain sphere of 
freedom against the state. Most human rights provisions in the Convention and its 
Protocols
32
 were accordingly phrased in a substantive way. The Court already expressed in 
its view that in addition to such negative obligations the Convention rights includes also 
positive obligations. Furthermore, the Court finding a substantive violation of Article 3 
does not always exclude the possibility of determining that there has been a breach of the 
effective investigation obligation.
33
 The Court has recognized a wide variety of positive 
obligations flowing from all human rights provisions in the Convention which guarantees 
that the rights under the Convention are not theoretical or illusory but practical and 
effective.
34
  
 
                                                 
31
 A. v the United Kingdom, no. 90 (1998) 27 EHRR 61  
32
 Protocols No. 1, 4, 5, 6,  7, 12, 13 and 14 
33
 Menesheva v. Russia, no, 59261/00, 9 March 2006, § 61-74 
34
 Ilhan v. Turkey (2000), no. 22277/93, 27 June 2000, §91 
16 
 
The wording of Article 3 appears only to contain a negative obligation that Contracting 
Parties ensure that its authorities refrain from inflicting ill-treatment
35
 on individuals 
within their jurisdiction. Moreover, Article 3 also imposes positive obligation to prevent 
and ensure that individuals within Contracting Parties‟ jurisdiction are not subjected to 
torture and other forms of ill-treatment by state agents or private individuals. The Court, 
drawing on case-law under Article 2, has argued that the fundamental character of Article 
3 read together with Article 1 created such obligation.
36
 Notwithstanding, a failure to 
conduct a proper and timely investigation by itself constitute a violation of the Convention, 
but the absence of such an investigation is likely to make it difficult to prove  plausible 
explanation for supports the applicant‟s evidence.37  
 
The principal purpose of the Article 3 is to protect individual rights from violation and 
require a state to refrain from interference with the rights but if violation occurs the state 
has obligation to investigate in order to find violator regardless he or she is state agent or 
private individual. In Osman v. the United Kingdom case the Court held that states have 
obligations to take reasonable steps to prevent vulnerable persons from being subject to ill-
treatment where the domestic authorities had or ought to have had knowledge of that ill-
treatment. The Court sees that if persons are known to be at risk in that case situation puts 
duty upon states to take specific protective operational measures where individuals are 
known to be at immediate risk from others.
38
 Article 3 places a negative duty on the state 
not to inflict the proscribed suffering on human beings, as well as a positive duty to ensure 
that these forms of suffering are not endured. In addition to that, the Court has developed 
the scope of Article 3 to include an implied duty of States to conduct an effective 
investigation in case of alleged violations of Article 3. 
 
These inherent obligations and certain rights under Article 3, which have the substantive 
and procedural aspects, are separated from each other. Following section discusses the 
procedural obligations such as the obligation to investigate allegations of ill-treatment and 
the obligation to protect against ill-treatment by private individuals under Article 3.   
 
                                                 
35
 Like: “No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” 
36
 L.C.B. v. the United Kingdom, no.23413/94, 9 June 1998, §36 
37
 Z. and Others v. The United Kingdom, no 29392/95, 10 May 2001 
38
 Osman v. the United Kingdom, no. 23452/94, 28 October 1998 § 116 
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 1.3.1 The procedural obligations 
 
The Court‟s case-laws indicate that the positive obligation of protection under Article 3 
places states under a positive obligation to prevent torture and ill-treatment and to carry out 
effective investigation into allegations of ill-treatment and punish violator of Article 3. 
Accordingly, states have a positive obligation to ensure that individuals within their 
jurisdiction are not subjected to the prescribed treatment, including ill-treatment 
administrated by a private individual.
39
 In addition to these, the positive obligation 
manifests itself in the principle that state may violate Article 3 even by extraditing an 
individual to a country where there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real 
risk to the extradited individual to be subjected to torture or ill-treatment. It can be further 
argued that the expulsion and extradition may infringe Article 3 because of their direct 
physical or mental effects.
40
 The famous cases like, Soering v. United Kingdom,
41
 Chahal 
v. United Kingdom,
42
 and D. v. United Kingdom
43
 cases show that deportation of a person 
to a country where a real risk that individual could be tortured which offend Article 3. 
These cases show that positive obligation under Article 3 puts duty on the states to prevent 
torture both within their jurisdiction and not to give grounds to other states to do so as a 
result of their involvement. In Soering v. United Kingdom, the Court puts like that: 
 
82. …The applicant likewise submitted that Article 3 (art. 3) not only 
prohibits the Contracting States from causing inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment to occur within their jurisdiction but also 
embodies an associated obligation not to put a person in a position where 
he will or may suffer such treatment or punishment at the hands of other 
States. For the applicant, at least as far as Article 3 (art. 3) is concerned, 
an individual may not be surrendered out of the protective zone of the 
Convention without the certainty that the safeguards which he would 
enjoy are as effective as the Convention standard. 
                                                 
39
 Pretty v. United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR 1 case shows that the obligation of the state to ensure that 
individuals within its jurisdiction is not subjected to torture or ill –treatment does not extend to the provision 
of lawful opportunity for assisted suicide in circumtances of significant physical and mental suffering. 
40
 Pieter Van Dijk, Fried Van Hoof, Arjen Van Rijn and Leo Zwaak, Theory and Practice of the European 
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88.   The question remains whether the extradition of a fugitive to 
another State where he would be subjected or be likely to be subjected to 
torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment would itself 
engage the responsibility of a Contracting State under Article 3 (art. 3). 
That the abhorrence of torture has such implications is recognised in 
Article 3 of the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, which provides 
that "no State Party shall ... extradite a person where there are substantial 
grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to 
torture". The fact that a specialised treaty should spell out in detail a 
specific obligation attaching to the prohibition of torture does not mean 
that an essentially similar obligation is not already inherent in the general 
terms of Article 3 (art. 3) of the European Convention. It would hardly be 
compatible with the underlying values of the Convention, that "common 
heritage of political traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of law" to 
which the Preamble refers, were a Contracting State knowingly to 
surrender a fugitive to another State where there were substantial grounds 
for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture, 
however heinous the crime allegedly committed. Extradition in such 
circumstances, while not explicitly referred to in the brief and general 
wording of Article 3 (art. 3), would plainly be contrary to the spirit and 
intendment of the Article, and in the Court‟s view this inherent obligation 
not to extradite also extends to cases in which the fugitive would be faced 
in the receiving State by a real risk of exposure to inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment proscribed by that Article (art. 3).
44
 
 
The positive obligations contain both preventative and investigatory elements. At his book, 
European Human Rights Law, Keir Starmer argues that positive obligations may 
encompass a wide range of duties where the scope of these duties and the circumstances in 
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which they apply will vary from case to case. These duies
45
 are recognized by the Court, 
may be generalized as following:
 46
 
 
1) a duty to put in place a legal framework which provides effective 
protection for Convention rights; 
2) a duty to prevent breaches of Convention rights; 
3) a duty to provide information and advice relevant to the breach of 
Convention rights; 
4) a duty to respond to breach of the Convention rights; 
              5) a duty to provide resources to individuals to prevent breaches of their   
               Convention rights 
 
In order to narrow state positive obligations even more down under the Article the state 
obligations can be examined with following generalisation: a) the obligation to investigate 
allegations of ill-treatment and b) the obligation to protect against ill-treatment by private 
individuals. 
 
The obligation to take effective investigation in case of torture or ill-treatment is the 
procedural limb of Article 3. The jurisprudential justifications for the Court to develop 
these obligations are derived from a combination of the substantive Convention rights 
allied with the general duty of member states to secure Convention right and freedoms to 
all persons in their jurisdictions. However, from pragmatic reason subjecting states to 
duties of investigation is to seek to ensure that, among others, right freedom from torture or 
ill-treatment by state agents are respected and enforced in practice. The Court at the case-
law, Corsacov v. Moldova determined that:
47
  
 
69…The investigation into serious allegations of ill-treatment must be 
thorough. That means that the authorities must always make a serious 
attempt to find out what happened and should not rely on hasty or ill-
founded conclusions to close their investigation or as the basis of their 
decisions (see the Assenov and Others v. Bulgaria, § 103 et seq.). They 
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must take all reasonable steps available to them to secure the evidence 
concerning the incident, including, inter alia, eyewitness testimony and 
forensic evidence (see, Tanrıkulu v. Turkey [GC], no. 23763/94, ECHR 
1999-IV, § 104 et seq. and Gül v. Turkey, no. 22676/93, § 89, 14 
December 2000). Any deficiency in the investigation which undermines 
its ability to establish the cause of injuries or the identity of the persons 
responsible will risk falling foul of this standard. 
 
The Court has acknowledged the theoretical basis of Article 3, however, has only been 
willing to recognize the practical relevance of Article 3. Failures of the judicial authorities 
to take up investigations will also engage the obligation in Article 3. In its judgment in the 
case of Ilhan v. Turkey, the Court added the following: 
 
1.  Procedural obligations have been implied in varying contexts under 
the Convention, where this has been perceived as necessary to ensure that 
the rights guaranteed under the Convention are not theoretical or illusory 
but practical and effective.
48
  
 
The obligation to carry out an effective investigation into allegations of ill-treatment is a 
procedural obligation. Violation of Article 3 based on failures to comply with the positive 
obligation is referred to as procedural obligation of Article 3.
49
 In Assenov v. Bulgaria case 
the Court made a finding of procedural breach of Article 3 also due to inadequate 
investigation made by the authorities into the applicants complains. The court describes the 
importance of investigation and revealing of violators:  
  
102.…where and individual raises an arguable claim that he has seriously 
ill-treated by the police or other such agents of the State unlawfully and 
in breach of Article 3, that provision, read in conjunction with the State‟s 
general duty under Article 1 of the Convention to „secure to everyone 
within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in [the] 
Convention‟, requires by implication that there should be an effective 
official investigation. This investigation, as with that punishment of those 
responsible… If this were not the case, the general legal prohibition of 
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torture and inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment, despite its 
fundamental importance… would be ineffective in practice and it would 
be possible in some cases for agents of the State to abuse the rights of 
those within their control with virtual impunity”. 50 
  
The obligation to protect against ill-treatment by private individuals better illustrated at the 
A. v the United Kingdom case. The Court acknowledges that the positive obligation of 
protecting under Article 3 may require states to do more than enact and enforce criminal 
law. It requires states to take action to protect persons from serious ill-treatment originating 
from both state agents and private individuals. The Court makes judgment with at the A. v 
the United Kingdom case with this wording: 
 
… The obligation on High Contracting Parties under Article 1 of the 
Convention to secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and 
freedoms defined in the Convention, taken together with Article 3, 
requires States to take measures designed to ensure that individuals 
within their jurisdiction are not subjected to torture or inhuman or 
degrading treatment, including such ill-treatment administered by private 
individuals.
51
 
 
The positive obligations which have an impact on national criminal law are aimed at 
protecting citizens from state and non-state actors. Such protection requires the existence 
of effective domestic law provisions criminalising ill-treatment by private individuals and 
adequate application of those provisions by the judiciary.
52
 The Court has, inter alia, 
recognized obligations to put in place criminal law provisions to deter certain forms of 
behavior, to create and operate law-enforcement machinery for the prevention, suppression 
and sanctioning of breaches of those provisions and to investigate reasonable claims of 
human rights violations. The Court thus requires the state, in certain circumstances, to use 
criminal law to secure Convention rights. In other words, the positive obligation of 
protection under Article 3 may require states to do more than enact criminal law offences 
designed to safeguard personal integrity. 
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It follows from the jurisprudence discussed above that the positive obligation is to take 
steps to protect individuals from ill-treatment at the hands of the state agents or private 
individuals and effectively investigate alleged violation of Article 3 and punish rights 
violator. In other words, the State‟s obligation in this respect includes in certain well-
defined circumstances a positive obligation on the authorities to take preventive 
operational measures to protect an individual whose life is at risk from criminal act of 
another individual (state agent or private individual). However, in some cases the use of 
force is allowed against individuals in the exercise of legitimate State functions, as in the 
context of making arrest. The following section investigates the limit of justified use of 
force, and negative obligation on State‟s obligation to refrain from inflicting ill-treatment 
on individuals within their jurisdiction. 
 
1.3.2 Substantive obligations (negative obligations) 
 
The wording of Article 3 is phrased in substantive terms. At the first sight, Article 3 
appears to impose only a negative obligation on Contracting Parties to ensure prohibition 
of maltreatment by law enforcement officers, such as police and security forces within its 
jurisdiction. However, as discussed in the previous sub-sections, there is a positive 
obligation under Article 3 to curry out effective investigation into allegations of ill-
treatment and to take measures designed to ensure that individuals within Contracting 
Party jurisdiction are not subjected to ill-treatment, including ill-treatment administrated by 
private individuals. Therefore, the Court recognized that Article 3, read in conjunction with 
the general obligation to rescuer rights under Article 1, stipulates a duty to provide 
remedies for the victims of torture and makes Article 3 not theoretical or illusory but 
practical and effective. 
53
 Moreover, this sub-section discusses only a substantive 
(negative) obligation of the Contracting Parties under Article 3 where State has obligation 
to refrain from inflicting serious harm on persons within their jurisdiction. In Pretty v. the 
United Kingdom case: 
  
2.  An examination of the Court's case-law indicates that Article 3 has 
been most commonly applied in contexts in which the risk to the 
individual of being subjected to any of the proscribed forms of treatment 
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emanated from intentionally inflicted acts of State agents or public 
authorities… It may be described in general terms as imposing a 
primarily negative obligation on States to refrain from inflicting serious 
harm on persons within their jurisdiction. However, in light of the 
fundamental importance of Article 3, the Court has reserved to itself 
sufficient flexibility to address the application of that Article in other 
situations that might arise… 
3.  In particular, the Court has held that the obligation on the High 
Contracting Parties under Article 1 of the Convention to secure to 
everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in the 
Convention, taken in conjunction with Article 3, requires States to take 
measures designed to ensure that individuals within their jurisdiction are 
not subjected to torture or inhuman and degrading treatment or 
punishment, including such treatment administered by private 
individuals... A positive obligation on the State to provide protection 
against inhuman or degrading treatment has been found to arise in a 
number of cases: see, for example, A. v. the United Kingdom…, where 
four child applicants were severely abused and neglected by their parents. 
Article 3 also imposes requirements on State authorities to protect the 
health of persons deprived of liberty...”54  
 
Despite the absolute nature of the prohibition of ill-treatment by the Article 3 there are 
situations where law enforcement officers of States sometimes must use force when 
effecting an arrest if the arrestee resists the arrest by violent or forceful means. In Klaas v. 
Germany
55
 case the dissenting opinion of judge Pettiti states:  
 
“While the police must intervene to provide the necessary protection and 
law enforcement, they have to respect fundamental rights when doing so. 
The basic rule is that the police must protect the individual from any 
violence and ensure people‟s physical safety. When called upon to act in 
regard to serious criminal offences, they are not entitled to use violence 
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other than in circumstances of self-defense (légitime défense) or forceful 
resistance, and then the response must be proportionate to the danger.”56   
 
The Court did not find a violation of Article 3, for example in Klaas v. Germany and 
Douglas-Williams v. the United Kingdom
57
 cases because it concluded that the use of force 
by police officers in the course of arrest was justifiable. Meanwhile,  there are many cases 
in which the Court has found a substantive violation of Article 3 where the Court found 
that such use of force were excessive and therefore amounted to ill-treatment within the 
meaning of Article 3.
58
 In Pretty v. the United Kingdom case the Court held its judgment: 
 
50. An examination of the Court's case-law indicates that Article 3 has 
been most commonly applied in contexts in which the risk to the 
individual of being subjected to any of the proscribed forms of treatment 
emanated from intentionally inflicted acts of State agents or public 
authorities… It may be described in general terms as imposing a 
primarily negative obligation on States to refrain from inflicting serious 
harm on persons within their jurisdiction.
59
 
   
These cases in which the Court has found a substantive violation can be divided into three 
different groups of cases: 1) ill-treatment intentionally inflicted by law enforcement 
officers, such as police and other security forces;
60
 2) ill-treatment resulting from a lawful 
or unlawful act carried out by State agents;
61
 3) ill-treatment resulted from State agent‟s 
failing to assist persons in need.
62
 In generally speaking, these cases are about the 
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violations where state agents, national authorities have involved to commit or failed to 
assist persons in order to avoid breach of Article 3.  
 
This reasoning indicates that violation of substantive obligation to ensure prohibition of ill-
treatment by law enforcement officers, such as police and security forces within its 
jurisdiction can be violated by the ill-treatment inflicting from lawful actions of State 
agents and ill-treatment inflicted from unlawful actions of State agents. In either case, as 
procedural obligation of State under the Convention demands, the state has duty to conduct 
an effective investigation in order to identify and punish of the person responsible for the 
alleged violation.   
 
In Assenov and Others v. Bulgaria case the Court found a breach of the procedural part of 
Article 3 but no breach of substantive part of Article 3. In fact, sometimes the Court is 
unable to find a substantive violation precisely because the burden of proof shifts on the 
national authorities responsible for providing a complete and sufficient explanation when 
the state in question fails to take basic investigative steps. It is a reason the substantive 
violation might be very difficult or impossible for the applicants to prove.
63
 In Kmetty v. 
Hungary case, the Court stated:  
 
4.  The Court observes that following the applicant's complaint, the 
authorities carried out an investigation into the applicant's allegations. It 
is not, however, persuaded that this investigation was sufficiently 
thorough and effective to meet the above requirements of Article 3.
64
 
 
In a number of the cases, as those that will be discussed in this section, involving alleged 
breaches of the right to be free from ill-treatment guaranteed by Article 3 of the 
Convention the applicants have been unable to establish required standard of proof for the 
substantive violation. The Court has found a procedural violation on the account of the 
lack of an effective investigation. 
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1.3.3 Is the procedural part of Article 3 threatening the substantive part 
of Article 3? 
 
At the previous sub-sections, the procedural and substantive obligations of Article 3 were 
analyzed and discussed. This sub-section is trying to answer the research question number 
1 of the thesis: whether procedural part of Article 3 is threatening the absolute and 
unconditional character of the substantive part of it. It is one of the problematic issued for 
the Court approach to the cases under the scope of Article 3 of the Convention. Luzius 
Wildhaber, the then president of the European Court of Human Rights, also admitted that 
sometimes the Court finds itself something of a dilemma like, should it examine the 
substantive complaint at the root of the application, or confine itself to establishing a 
procedural violation.
65
The scope of the positive obligations depends on the nature of the 
complaint,
66
 including the nature of the substantive rights invoked in conjunction, with a 
stricter and broader obligation recognized in the case of alleged violations of fundamental 
rights of non-derogable nature, such as the freedom from torture or other forms of ill-
treatment.
67
 The procedural obligation under Article 3 of the Convention is not linked to 
the actual violation of a primary substantive obligation safeguarded by the provision. The 
lack of effective investigation or the failure to award remedies may on their own account 
amount to a breach of Article 3. In other words, under Article 3 of the Convention, a state 
must conduct an effective official investigation that should lead to the identification and 
punishment of the persons responsible for the alleged violation. This approach was 
reaffirmed in Assenov and Others v. Bulgaria case-law with regard to the scope of Article 
3. In Assenov case, the Court found a breach of the procedural part of Article 3 but no 
breach of substantive part of Article 3. In fact, sometimes the Court is unable to find a 
substantive violation precisely because the burden of proof shifts on the national 
authorities responsible for providing a complete and sufficient explanation when the state 
in question fails to take basic investigative steps. It is a reason why the substantive 
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violation might be very difficult or impossible for the applicants to prove.
68
 In Kmetty v. 
Hungary, case the Court states:  
 
36. In these circumstances, the Court finds it impossible to establish on 
the basis of the evidence before it whether or not the applicant's injuries 
were caused by the police exceeding the force necessary to overcome his 
resistance to a lawful police measure, either while immobilising and 
taking him to the police station or during his custody.
69
 
 
In a number of the cases
70
 involving alleged breaches of the right to freedom from ill-
treatment guaranteed by Article 3 of the Convention has been unable to establish required 
standard of proof for the substantive violation. The Court has found a procedural violation 
on account of the lack of an effective investigation but no breach of substantive part of 
Article 3. A procedural violation does not carry same stigma as a substantive violation and 
a procedural violation is obviously less serious than a violation of ill-treatment. Along 
these lines, the procedural violation of inadequate investigation is not as grace as an 
accusation that state officials engaged in torture. In any this kind of event effective judicial 
proceedings at national level capable of establishing the true facts at the origin of the 
allegation fails. In Poltoratskiy v. Ukraine case the Court had not established “beyond 
reasonable doubt” that ill-treatment attaining the minimum level of severity had occurred. 
The Court found not a breach of the substantive part of Article 3 but finds a breach at the 
procedural part: 
 
“5. …the Court shares the findings and reasoning of the Commission and 
concludes that the applicant‟s arguable claim that he was ill-treated in 
prison was not subject to an effective investigation by the domestic 
authorities as required by Article 3 of the Convention. 
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6.  There has therefore been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention in 
this regard.”71 
 
It is not necessary for the Court to find a substantive violation of Article 3 before the Court 
can examine whether the respondent Contracting Party has complied with its procedural 
obligation under that article. In other words, before the identification of separate 
substantive and procedural obligations of Article 3, an inadequate investigation can be an 
element on which an applicant could rely to prove a violation of the Article as whole. In 
fact sometimes the Court is unable to find a substantive violation accurately because the 
respondent Government has violated its procedural obligation by not conducting an 
effective investigation.
72
 In particular, where the authorities fail to take basic investigative 
steps the substantive violation might very difficult or impossible for the applicant to prove. 
It is fundamental to the machinery of protection established by the Convention that the 
national systems themselves provide redress for breaches of its provisions, the Court 
exerting its supervisory role subject to the principle of subsidiary. It was well expressed by 
the Court in Z. and Others v. the United Kingdom case: 
 
7.  … the object and purpose underlying the Convention, as set out in 
Article 1, is that the rights and freedoms should be secured by the 
Contracting State within its jurisdiction. It is fundamental to the 
machinery of protection established by the Convention that the national 
systems themselves provide redress for breaches of its provisions, the 
Court exerting its supervisory role subject to the principle of subsidiary. 
In that context, Article 13, which requires an effective remedy in respect 
of violations of the Convention, takes on a crucial function. The 
applicants' complaints are essentially that that they have not been 
afforded a remedy in the courts for the failure to ensure them the level of 
protection against abuse to which they were entitled under Article 3 of 
the Convention. The domestic courts referred to “the public-policy 
                                                 
71
 Poltoratskiy v. Ukraine, no. 38812/97, 29 April 2009 § 127-128 
72
 Ugur Erdal & Hasan Bakirci,  Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights – A Practitioner’s 
Handbook, Geneva 2006, p. 228 
29 
 
consideration that has first claim on the loyalty of the law” as being that 
“wrongs should be remedied” …73 
 
The effective judicial proceedings at national level are capable of establishing the true facts 
at the origin of the allegations. The case like Khashiyev and Akayeva v. Russia showed that 
it was not possible for the Court to conclude that the victims were tortured before they 
were killed. The judgment of the Khashiyev and Akayeva ruled that failed conduct of 
investigation makes for the court impossible to find a substantive violation of Article 3.  
With this finding of procedural violation the Court recognized that:  
 
8.  The procedural limb of Article 3 is invoked, in particular, where the 
Court is unable to reach any conclusions as to whether there has been 
treatment prohibited by Article 3 of the Convention, deriving, at least in 
part, from the failure of the authorities to react effectively to such 
complaints at the relevant time...
74
 
 
Above mentioned cases, the Court‟s approach, are problematic for the absolute 
and unconditional character of the substantive part of Article 3. This approach 
undermines an applicant‟s attempt to prove substantive violation of Article 3 and 
it can be seen that when the Court finds a procedural violation of Article 3, it may 
be less inclined to find a substantive one. The main concern here is that a 
procedural violations does not carry the same stigma as substantive violation. The 
procedural violation of inadequate investigation is not as grave as a judgment that 
state officials engaged in torture. Besides, the procedural violations are often met 
with procedural, not substantive, remedies. For example, the Committee of 
Ministers
75
 decides whether the state promulgated general measures to prevent 
new violations.
76
 In this logic, when the Court finds a procedural violation of 
Article 3, the faulty policy is investigation procedure. The state accordingly would 
at most be responsible for changing the procedure not for preventing or revealing 
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any ill-treatment practices that might exist. In other words, the negative 
prohibition in Article 3 is absolute but positive obligations which flow from it are 
not absolute because the State can exercise some judgment
77
 in applying them.
78
 
Thus, the focus on the procedural components of Article 3 threatens the absolute 
and unconditional character of the substantive part of Article 3. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
INHERENT STATE OBLIGATIONS UNDER ARTICLE 13   
  
2. Right to an Effective Remedy before a National Authority 
Article 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights has proven difficult both to 
interpret and apply. This article may only be invoked in conjunction with an alleged 
violation of a right protected in the Convention and thus, it is not a free standing rights. 
The Court‟s methodology was not to engage in detailed, separate assessment under Article 
13, but to reiterate its findings concerning the lack of effective investigations under a 
substantive provision of Article 3 to justify its separate finding of a breach of Article 13. 
This chapter discusses interpretation and application of implied state duty of Article 13 in 
conjunction with Article 3. The Article 13 of the Convention states that: 
Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are 
violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority 
notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting 
in an official capacity. 
Article 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights require states to provide effective 
remedies before the national authorities in respect of complaints made by persons that their 
Conventional rights have been violated.
79
 The Court‟s jurisprudence on the interpretation 
of Article 13 is well described in the case of Silver and Others v. the United Kingdom.
80
 
The Court ruled that: 
 
“113. The principles that emerge from the Court‟s jurisprudence on the 
interpretation of Article 13 (art. 13) include the following: 
(a) where an individual has an arguable claim to be the victim of a 
violation of the rights set forth in the Convention, he should have a 
remedy before a national authority in order both to have his claim 
decided and, if appropriate, to obtain redress…; 
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(b) the authority referred to in Article 13 (art. 13) may not 
necessarily be a judicial authority but, if it is not, its powers and the 
guarantees which it affords are relevant in determining whether the 
remedy before it is effective…; 
(c) although no single remedy may itself entirely satisfy the 
requirements of Article 13 (art. 13), the aggregate of remedies 
provided for under domestic law may do so…; 
(d) neither Article 13 (art. 13) nor the Convention in general lays 
down for the Contracting States any given manner for ensuring 
within their internal law the effective implementation of any of the 
provisions of the Convention - for example, by incorporating the 
Convention into domestic law…”81 
 
The object of Article 13 is to provide a means whereby individuals can obtain 
relief at national level for violations of their Convention rights before having 
complaint before the Court. Moreover, Article 13 has more general obligation on 
State to provide an effective remedy than for example the obligation to be found 
under Article 6. The requirement of effectiveness under Article 13 can be usefully 
compared with the meaning of remedies under Article 35, which need to be 
exhausted by the domestic remedies before an applicant brings complains before 
the Court. Article 6 (1)
82
 in this regard guarantees procedural rights, including the 
right of everyone to “a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an 
independent and impartial tribunal established by law”. It is more concrete and 
increases effectiveness by introducing approach of “within a reasonable time”. 
Luzius Wildhaber, the then President of European Court of Human Rights, 
arguers that: 
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 “...the Convention guarantees contain an implied positive obligation to 
set up and render effective procedures making it possible to vindicate the 
right concerned at national level. This is of course confirmed by the 
requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies under Article 35 of the 
Convention and the obligation to afford an effective remedy under 
Article 13.”83  
 
In Z. and Others vs. the United Kingdom
84
 case the Court indicates that Article 13 have 
some applicability in cases involving the indirect responsibility of the state arising out of 
its positive duties to take action to avoid violations by individuals of the human rights of 
others. The Court rules that: 
 
109.  … where a right with as fundamental an importance as the right to 
life or the prohibition against torture, inhuman and degrading treatment is 
at stake, Article 13 requires, in addition to the payment of compensation 
where appropriate, a thorough and effective investigation capable of 
leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible, 
including effective access for the complainant to the investigation 
procedure… These cases, however, concerned alleged killings or 
infliction of treatment contrary to Article 3 involving potential criminal 
responsibility on the part of security force officials. Where alleged failure 
by the authorities to protect persons from the acts of others is concerned, 
Article 13 may not always require that the authorities undertake the 
responsibility for investigating the allegations. There should, however, be 
available to the victim or the victim's family a mechanism for 
establishing any liability of State officials or bodies for acts or omissions 
involving the breach of their rights under the Convention. Furthermore, 
in the case of a breach of Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention, which rank 
as the most fundamental provisions of the Convention, compensation for 
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the non-pecuniary damage flowing from the breach should in principle be 
part of the range of available remedies. 
 
Thus, the object of Article 13 is to provide a means whereby individuals can obtain relief at 
national level for violations of their Conventional rights before having to set in motion the 
international machinery of complaint before the Court.
85
 In the context of Article 13, 
adequate remedy means that the national authority must be able to assess the element of 
risk primarily with reference to those facts which were known or ought to have been known 
to the state at the time of lawful use of force. The implied state obligations under Article 13 
can be examined with following generalisations:  
 
a) obligation to provide an effective domestic remedy where person have 
an arguable claim to be the victim of a violation of Convention rights;  
b) obligation of effective investigation.
86
  
 
The duty of effective investigation under Article 13 is to be seen as an integral element of 
the general obligation of member states to provide effective domestic remedies for alleged 
breaches of the Convention. An effective domestic remedy to determine complaints 
regarding unreasonable delays in civil and criminal proceedings is one of the major 
concerns of the Court.
87
 The Court held in Kudla v. Poland case that obligation on the 
contracting Parties would be: 
 
155.  If Article 13 is, as the Government argued, to be interpreted as 
having no application to the right to a hearing within a reasonable time as 
safeguarded by Article 6 § 1, individuals will systematically be forced to 
refer to the Court in Strasbourg complaints that would otherwise, and in 
the Court's opinion more appropriately, have to be addressed in the first 
place within the national legal system. In the long term the effective 
functioning, on both the national and international level, of the scheme of 
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human rights protection set up by the Convention is liable to be 
weakened.
88
  
 
The obligation of effective investigation was created equivalent forms of positive 
obligation under Article 13. In Velikova v. Bulgaria case the Court stated that: 
 
 “…The scope of obligation under Article 13 also varies depending on 
the nature of the applicant‟s compliant under the Convention. 
Nevertheless, the remedy required by Article 13 must be „effective‟ in 
practice as well as in law, in particular in the case that its exercise 
must not unjustifiably hindered by the acts or omissions of the 
authorities of the respondent State.”89  
 
Furthermore, the Court found implications for Article 13 at the right safeguarded under 
Article 3. It described this jurisprudence in Aksoy v. Turkey
90
 case as such:  
 
98. The nature of the right safeguarded under Article 3 of the 
Convention (art. 3) has implications for Article 13 (art. 13).  Given the 
fundamental importance of the prohibition of torture (see paragraph 
62 above) and the especially vulnerable position of torture victims, 
Article 13 (art. 13) imposes, without prejudice to any other remedy 
available under the domestic system, an obligation on States to carry 
out a thorough and effective investigation of incidents of torture. 
 
Accordingly, as regards Article 13 (art. 13), where an individual has 
an arguable claim that he has been tortured by agents of the State, the 
notion of an "effective remedy" entails, in addition to the payment of 
compensation where appropriate, a thorough and effective 
investigation capable of leading to the identification and punishment 
of those responsible and including effective access for the 
complainant to the investigatory procedure.  It is true that no express 
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provision exists in the Convention such as can be found in Article 12 
of the 1984 United Nations Convention against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, which 
imposes a duty to proceed to a "prompt and impartial" investigation 
whenever there is a reasonable ground to believe that an act of torture 
has been committed. However, in the Court's view, such a requirement 
is implicit in the notion of an "effective remedy" under Article 13 (art. 
13) (see, mutatis mutandis, the Soering judgment cited at paragraph 62 
above, pp. 34-35, para. 88).
91
 
 
Another ambiguity in the Article 13 cases relates to the circumstances where the Court 
willing to examine whether there has been an effective investigation under both Article 3 
and Article 13. An effective investigation is the crucial foundation for other remedies then 
the Court is likely to examine the issue under Article 13, in addition to applying obligations 
under the substantive Article. The Court puts it in specific way in the case of Akdeniz and 
Others v. Turkey:
92
 
 
9.  The Court reiterates that Article 13 of the Convention guarantees the 
availability at the national level of a remedy to enforce the substance of 
the Convention rights and freedoms in whatever form they might happen 
to be secured in the domestic legal order. Article 13 thus requires the 
provision of a domestic remedy to deal with the substance of an 
“arguable complaint” under the Convention and to grant appropriate 
relief, although the Contracting States are afforded some discretion as to 
the manner in which they conform to their Convention obligations under 
this provision. The scope of the obligation under Article 13 also varies 
depending on the nature of the applicant‟s complaint under the 
Convention. Nevertheless, the remedy required by Article 13 must be 
“effective” in practice as well as in law, in particular in the sense that its 
exercise must not be unjustifiably hindered by the acts or omissions of 
the authorities of the respondent...
93
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Finally, the effect of Article 13 is that this article generates close relationship between 
effective investigation, effective remedies and the requirement of exhaustion of domestic 
remedies. In Paul and Audrey Edwards v. the United Kingdom
94
 case the Court clarified 
that the obligation of effective investigation “is not an obligation of result, but of means”.95 
On the other hand, if an applicant succeeds in demonstrating that a particular remedy is 
ineffective,
96
 the conduct complained of constitutes an administrative practice than there is 
no obligation to exhaust ineffective remedy. In this case the situation will release the 
applicant from requirement of exhausting domestic remedy as well as it may also lead the 
Court to find a procedural violation of Article 3 or a violation of Article 13.
97
  
 
It was confirmed in the context of Article 13, the Court pointed direct expression to the 
States‟ obligation to protect human rights first and foremost within their own legal system, 
establishing an additional guarantee for an individual in order to ensure that he or she 
effectively enjoys those rights. The Article 13 accordingly provides a means whereby 
individuals can obtain relief at national level for violations of their Convention rights 
before having to set in motion the international machinery of complaint before the Court. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
INVESTIGATION OF ILL-TREATMENT 
 
3. Overlapping at the effective official investigation of ill-treatment in 
compliance with the requirements of Article 3 and Article 13 of the 
Convention 
 
At the previous chapters, the State obligation to carry out effective investigation was 
discussed either from the standpoint of the positive obligation inherent in Article 3 or from 
the standpoint of the right to an effective remedy under Article 13. In other words, the 
ineffectiveness of an investigation is a violation of the positive obligation under Article 3 
and/or of the obligation under Article 13 to provide an effective remedy. This Chapter is 
discussing overlapping jurisprudence of Article 3 and Article 13 on an effective official 
investigation of ill-treatment and, additionally, investigates whether there is convincing 
reasons for choosing Article 13 “over” Article 3 or only choosing procedural part of 
Article 3 should be sufficient for examining the lack of a thorough and effective 
investigation during the breach of Article 3. This part of the thesis is going to bring a legal 
explanation to the research question number 3 of the thesis which addresses the same 
problem: How much implied duty of States to conduct an effective investigation in case of 
alleged violations of Article 3 overlap with Article 13 which already provides a similar 
positive obligation or which Article should be chosen “over” another one for the conduct 
of the effective investigation. 
 
The Court recognized that Article 3, read in conjunction with the general obligation to 
secure rights under Article 1, requires a duty to provide remedies for the victims of torture. 
With this conjunction, the remedy for torture extends to everyone and not only to those 
victims, whose torture involves the respondent state.
98
 The Court has also created 
corresponding forms of positive obligations under Article 13 complains involving alleged 
breaches of Article 3. The chapter II discussed that Article 13 may only be invoked in 
conjunction with an alleged violation of a right protected under the Convention, which in 
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other words, it is not a free standing right. The Court case laws repeatedly emphasised that 
once an individual makes out an arguable claim relating to the substance of the complaints 
under Article 3, the notion of effectiveness under Article 13 entails the institutional
99
 and 
investigative/procedural
100
 elements parallel to that established under Article 3.
101
 The  
Court has argued that “…as regard to Article 13, where an individual has an arguable claim 
that he has been tortured by agents of the State, the notion of an effective remedy entails, 
in addition to payment of compensation where appropriate, a thorough and effective 
investigation capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible 
and including effective access for the complainant to the investigatory procedure.”102 
 
When the duty not to commit torture is violated and breach of a substantive duty is on stick 
it is an incumbent on the Court to carry out a separate consideration under Article 13. It 
reconfirms that in case of an alleged breach of the procedural limb of the positive 
obligations under Article 3 there is an overlapping relationship between such obligation 
and the effectiveness requirements under Article 13. In other words where there are no or 
insufficient procedural safeguards protecting the right in question, there may well be a 
violation of the right in both its substantive and procedural aspects of Article 3 and Article 
13. 
 
As it was discussed earlier, the Court‟s developed scope of Article 3 has included an 
implied duty of States to conduct an effective investigation in case of alleged violations of 
Article 3. This development has taken place in spite of Article 13 already providing a 
similar positive obligation. The Court has many times examined the allegations of a lack of 
an effective investigation under both Article 3 and Article 13 and found a violation of both 
Articles.
103
 In the circumstances, if the individual‟s right not to be subjected to torture and 
to benefit from an effective investigation about torture were breached by the State then the 
individul‟s complain would be considered arguable by the Court for the purposes of Article 
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13.
104
 In the Assenov and Others vs. Bulgaria case the Court refers to its findings that the 
applicant ”had an arguable claim that he had been ill-treated by agents of the State and that 
the domestic investigation of this claim was not sufficiently through and effective.”105 
Analyzing the substantive and procedural issues – whether the ill-treatment was motivated 
by the State policy or whether the authorities failed to investigate possible ill-treatment 
falls into the scope of Article 3. The Court has recognized an implied positive obligation 
upon states violating Article 3‟s substantive prohibition but Alastair Mowbray argues that 
the application of this duty by different Chambers has been problematic. He thinks that the 
Court‟s eager to conduct domestic investigations under Article 3, in contrast utilizing 
Article 13, remain obscure.
106
 In addition to this the Court also finds violation of Article 13 
of the Convention at Assenov case. The Court states that: “…in cases of alleged ill-
treatment contrary to Article 3, the State authorities were under an obligation under 
Article 13 to investigate promptly and impartially.”107 The Court finding at this case 
confirms that in the case of an alleged breach of the procedural limb of the positive 
obligations under Article 3 is an overlapping relationship between such obligations and the 
effectiveness requirement under Article 13.  
 
However, it must be admitted the Court‟s policy remains obscure and unclear when it 
comes to the relationship between the requirements to accumulate an effective 
investigation into alleged ill treatment under Article 3 and the corresponding requirement 
under Article 13. In Mehment Emin Yuksel vs. Turkey case “[t]he Court does not deem it 
necessary to make a separate finding under Article 3 of the Convention in respect of the 
alleged deficiencies in the investigation” and it finds investigation more appropriately 
examined under Article 13.
108
 As it was reflected at the quotation the Court‟s methodology 
is not to engage in a detailed and separate assessment under Article 13, but to reiterate its 
findings concerning the lack of effective investigations under a substantive provision to 
justify its separate finding of a breach of Article 13. In Ilhan vs. Turkey case the Court 
states that “[w]hether it is appropriate or necessary to find a procedural breach of Article 3 
will … depend on the circumstances of the particular case.”109 The discussion related to 
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the procedural duties of Article 3 and Article 13, is closely entwined with the inconsistency 
of the approaches followed by the Court in relation to the question whether the finding of a 
substantive violation of Article 3 can justify the exclusion of determining a breach of the 
effective investigation obligation under the same provision. 
 
3.1 Is investigation of alleged violations of ill-treatment effective more 
under Article 3 or Article 13 and why?  
 
 
As discussed above in case of an alleged breach of the procedural limb of the positive 
obligations under Article 3 there is an overlapping relationship between such obligation 
and the effectiveness requirements under Article 13. This would rise a question whether 
holding a respondent State to have breached the inquires of obligations under Article 3 
would justify abandoning a separate examination and a finding of a breach of the 
corresponding obligations under Article 13 or conversely whether such obligation can be 
ascertained solely in the context of Article 13. Following this argument this section will 
investigate to what extent article 13 supports the procedural obligations under article 3, and 
whether it should not just be applied in stead of or "chosen over" article 3, but rather used 
as complementary and supportive. 
 
The Ilhan v. Turkey case indicated that Article 13 should constitute the appropriate legal 
basis for examining the lack of an effective investigation into an arguable claim based on 
Article 3 cases. The applicant, Ilhan, claimed that there was a breach of Article 3 due to the 
lack of an effective investigation. The Court makes judgment on the grounds that: 
 
10.  … the requirement under Article 13 of the Convention that a person 
with an arguable claim of a violation of Article 3 be provided with an 
effective remedy will generally provide both redress to the applicant and 
the necessary procedural safeguards against abuses by State officials. The 
Court's case-law establishes that the notion of effective remedy in this 
context includes the duty to carry out a thorough and effective 
investigation capable of leading to the identification and punishment of 
those responsible for any ill-treatment and permitting effective access for 
the complainant to the investigatory procedure… Whether it is 
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appropriate or necessary to find a procedural breach of Article 3 will 
therefore depend on the circumstances of the particular case.  
 
11.  In the present case, the Court has found that the applicant has 
suffered torture at the hands of the security forces. His complaints 
concerning the lack of any effective investigation by the authorities into 
the cause of his injuries fall to be dealt with under Article 13 of the 
Convention.
110
 
 
In this connection, as stated above, the requirement of an effective remedy in Article 13 
was generally sufficient for an individual with an arguable claim of breach of Article 3. In 
this case, however, the Grand Chamber failed to explain why issues of investigative 
obligations under Article 3 can be so differentiated from the comparable obligations under 
Article 2 as to exempt on independent finding of violation under Article 3.
111
 The Court 
has recognized the importance of an Article 13 remedy in view of the fundamental 
importance of the prohibition of torture and the vulnerable position of a torture victim.  
Hence, indicated that Article 13 should constitute the appropriate legal basis for examining 
the lack of effective investigation into an arguable claim based on Article 3. However, in 
the context of ill-treatment occurring under the responsibility of state agents, examining it 
under Article 13, the Court has a number of occasions stated that the requirements of that 
Article are broader than the effective investigation duties respectively arising under Article 
3.
112
 The linkage between the shortcomings of an investigation and the ultimate 
effectiveness of domestic remedies, which is inherent to Article 13, does not exist under 
Article 3. 
 
The context of the actual occurrence of torture is hardly relevant for understanding the 
scope of Article 3. In this regard, the text of Article 13 is broad enough to encompass any 
torture in a similar way as in Article 3.
113
 The Court has taken the view that the absence of 
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any limitation clauses under Article 13 does not mean that this right is absolute. Therefore, 
Article 13 has disadvantage that it may be derogated from in time of public emergency, 
whereas Article 3 may not.
114
 Article 13 should be considered as having inherent 
limitations. Alastair Mowbray in his book, The Development of Positive Obligations under 
the European Convention on Human Rights by the European Court of Human Rights, 
argues that: the non-derogable nature of Article 2 and 3 rights are more susceptible to a 
separate and stringent appraisal of the requirements of Article 13 than in instances 
involving other provisions. In the Leander v. Sweden case, the Court therefore stated that: 
 
”79.  …the requirements of Article 13 will be satisfied if there exists 
domestic machinery whereby, subject to the inherent limitations of the 
context, the individual can secure compliance with the relevant 
laws…”115 
 
Article 3 is more restricted arises when there is an arguable claim that a person has been 
seriously ill-treated by state agents. In Ilhan v. Turkey case, a Grand Chamber took a more 
restrictive approach and stated that the requirement of an effective remedy in Article 13 
was generally sufficient for an individual with an arguable claim of breach of Article 3. It 
ruled that the existence of a procedural obligation to investigate under Article 3 would 
depend on the circumstances of the particular case. However, later the Court has not 
always looked for exceptional circumstances in which procedural obligation have been 
established. The danger that state agents might be tempted to ill-treat individuals is not 
insignificant in many Contracting states consequently a strong application of the effective 
investigation duty will provide additional discouragement for this form of abuse. Requiring 
such investigations under Article 3 is stronger rather than under Article 13. 
Notwithstanding, it is important to underline that the effectiveness of a remedy for the 
purpose of Article 13 does not hinge on the certainty of a favourable outcome for the 
applicant.  The ambiguity in the Article 13 cases relates to the circumstances where the 
Court is willing to examine whether there has been an effective investigation under both 
substantive Articles (Article 3, 3 or 5) and Article 13. This argument is a conclusion for 
this chapter that Article 13 supports the procedural obligations under article 3, and  it is not 
just be applied in stead of Article 3, but is used rather as complementary and supportive.  
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CONCLUSION  
 
As this thesis has supported its arguments with the Court judgments, case-laws, who has 
repeatedly held that where an individual makes a credible assertion that he or she has 
suffered treatment infringing Article 3 at the hands of the police or other similar agents of 
the State or private individuals, that provision read in conjunction with the State‟s general 
duty under Article 1 of the Convention, requires by implication that there should be an 
effective official investigation. As it was discussed, it is a procedural obligation under 
Article 3 upon the Contracting Parties of the Convention. In addition to this, as mentioned 
at the Chapter II, Article 3 imposes a negative obligation, an obligation to refrain from 
inflicting ill-treatment on individuals with their jurisdiction. If the Court finds that a 
Contracting Party has failed in its negative obligation, it finds a violation of Article 3 in its 
substantive aspect.  
 
The outcome of the research, the thesis, on implied Contracting Party‟s obligation under 
Article 3 of the Convention is convincing for the question number one of the research; 
whether procedural part of Article 3 threatening the absolute and unconditional character 
of the substantive part of Article 3. The thesis argued that the procedural obligation of 
Article 3 is threatening its absolute and unconditional character of the substantive part. The 
cases like, Assenov and Others v. Bulgaria, Poltoratskiy v. Ukraine and Khashiyev and 
Akayeva v. Russia confirmed that the Court finds no required standard of proof for the 
substantive violation if the Contracting Party fails to conclude that whether the victims 
were tortured or not. This approach shows that because of the lack of information the Court 
cannot conclude and prove the substantive violation of Article 3.  
 
No reason to mention again that the Court‟s approach is problematic for the absolute and 
unconditional character of the substantive part of Article 3. This approach undermines an 
applicant‟s attempt to prove substantive violation of Article 3 and it can be seen that when 
the Court finds a procedural violation of Article 3, it may be less inclined to find a 
substantive one. The main concern here is that a procedural violations does not carry the 
same stigma as substantive violation. The procedural violation of inadequate investigation 
is not as grave as a judgment that state officials engaged in torture. Besides, the procedural 
violations are often met with procedural, not substantive, remedies. To conclude, the 
negative prohibition in Article 3 is absolute but positive obligations which flow from it are 
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not absolute because the State can exercise some judgments
116
 in applying them.
117
 Thus, 
the focus on the procedural components of Article 3 threatens the absolute and 
unconditional character of the substantive part of Article 3. 
 
The second question of the thesis, whether the Court should examine substantive violation 
at the root of the application for Article 3 or should it confine itself to establishing a 
procedural violation, has also brought interesting discussion to the Chapter I. As a 
conclusion, the thesis can argue that it is not necessary for the Court to find a substantive 
violation of Article 3 before the Court can examine whether the respondent Contracting 
Party has complied with its procedural obligation under that article. In other words, before 
the identification of separate substantive and procedural obligations of Article 3, an 
inadequate investigation can be an element on which an applicant could rely to prove a 
violation of the Article as whole. In fact, as mentioned previously, sometimes, the Court is 
unable to find a substantive violation accurately because the respondent Government has 
violated its procedural obligation by not conducting an effective investigation.
118
 In 
particular, where the authorities fail to take basic investigative steps the substantive 
violation might very difficult or impossible for the applicant to prove. It is fundamental to 
the machinery of protection established by the Convention that the national systems 
themselves provide redress for breaches of its provisions, the Court exerting its supervisory 
role subject to the principle of subsidiary.  
 
The third question of the thesis, whether conduct an effective investigation in case of 
alleged violations of Article 3 overlap with Article 13 which already provides a similar 
positive obligation or whether which Article should be chosen over another one for to 
conduct an effective investigation, investigated the scope of Article 3 and Article 13. 
Chapter II developed an argument that the scope of Article 3 of the Convention has been 
elaborated and the boundaries of the Contracting Parties‟ jurisdiction have been resolved 
by the Court in its case-laws. The case-laws showed that the obligation of safeguard 
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personal integrity under Article 3 may require states to do more than enact and enforce 
criminal law. 
 
The research also showed that the emergence of a procedural right under Article 3 will 
likely result in more findings of faulty state investigations. The main concern for this is 
that in the context of Article 3 adequate remedy means that the national authority must be 
able to assess the element of risk primarily with reference to those facts which were known 
or ought to have been known to the state at the time of ill-treatment. Ever since in Assenov 
v. Bulgaria
119
 case the Court was established duties to investigate under Article 3 
respectively, it has repeatedly found procedural violations of those Articles without 
concurrent substantive ones. Alastair Mowbray argues that the effective investigation 
obligation under Article 3 is less developed and more uncertain in its application at the 
Court that the corresponding obligation created via Article 2.
120
 This research is also 
sharing this statement since obscure and unclear policy of the Court made it difficult when 
it came to the relationship between the requirement to accumulate an effective 
investigation into alleged ill-treatment under Article 3 and the corresponding requirement 
under Article 13. 
 
Since there are many Contracting Parties to the Convention, accordingly, the types and 
methods of domestic criminal investigations and criminal trails vary considerably. Neither 
the Convention nor the Court‟s case-laws require uniformity in this respect. However, the 
Court‟s paramount consideration is that whatever methods are employed, criminal 
investigations should be capable of establishing the accuracy of breach of ill-treatment and 
lead to the identification and punishment of those responsible. Additionally, it should be 
noted that the obligation to investigate “is not an obligation of result, but means”.121 In 
Mikheyev v. Russia case the Court stated that there is not a requirement for every criminal 
investigation result in a conviction. Attention must once more be made of the relationship 
between effective remedies and the requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies. If an 
applicant succeeds in demonstrating that a particular remedy in ineffective, this will not 
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only absolve the applicant from requirement of exhausting that remedy but may also lead 
the Court to find a procedural violation of Article 3 or a violation of Article 13. 
 
Finally, Article 3 has proved a difficult provision to interpret because of the generality of 
its text. Article 3 places a negative duty on the state not to inflict the proscribed suffering 
on human beings, as well as a positive duty to ensure that these forms of suffering are not 
endured. Requiring such investigations under Article 3, rather Article 13, will reflect the 
seriousness with which the Court characterises this type of ill-treatment. This does not 
reduce the importance of Article 13 in securing co-operation between national level 
systems and the internationally. It proved that extended article 13 supports the procedural 
obligations under article 3 and can be used as a complementary and supportive.  
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